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NOTE
EQUAL CREDIT:
YOU CAN GET THERE FROM HERE-
THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
INTRODUCTION
On October 28, 1975, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, amending
the Consumer Credit Production Act of 1968 went into effect.1 It is the
first comprehensive federal legislation that prohibits creditors from
discriminating against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital
status.2 Its legislative history is hardly impressive considering the
magnitude of the problem it seeks to redress. It was passed as a non-
germane Senate rider on an unrelated House bill. It was pushed
through in the waning days of the 93d Congress in a last ditch effort
to get some kind of legislation on the books before the close of the
legislative session.3 But for the women's equality groups and civil
rights activists who have been working for its passage it was a signi-
ficant breakthrough.
For about the past five years women have been waging a cam-
paign to: "Give a woman credit where credit is due." Their efforts
have consisted of a two pronged assault of attempts to influence legis-
lation and well publicized pressure tactics.' The passage of Equal Cre-
dit Opportunity (ECOA) marks the culmination of their work and the
1. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. VII,
amending Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1691 (Supp. I 1975)). Although this law was passed in 1974 its provisions did
not become effective until October 28, 1975, one year from the date of its enactment. This
one year delay was provided to give the Federal Reserve Board adequate time to prom-
ulgate regulations and to give creditors time to adjust their procedures to comply with
its mandate.
2. The Small Business Act was amended in 1974 to prohibit discrimination on the basis
of sex or marital status against a person applying for or receiving assistance from the
Small Business Administration. Act of January 2, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-237, amending 15
U.S.C. § 635 (1970). In addition, several federal agencies, including the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board, the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration
have issued guidelines prohibiting discrimination. See Gates, Credit Discrimination Against
Women: Cauases and Solutions, 27 VAND. L. Rxv. 409, 422-25 (1974).
S. Senator William Brock of Tennessee, one of the sponsors of the bill explained why
it was important to pass the Equal Credit Opportunity Act during that session:
[We] seek to attach this amendment . .. to the depository institutions amend-
ment, because we feel women's rights have taken the back seat for too long.
[This bill] has been in hibernation in the House for nearly 1 year.
120 CONG. Rc. 10,571 (daily ed. June 13, 1974).
4. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 1, col. 1. One participant explained it was easier to
gather support from women and politicians on the credit issue than on other issues be-
cause "it's a clean issue--not like abortion."
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
first federal guarantee that credit will be available to women on a
fair and impartial basis without regard to sex or marital status.
This note will pose the credit discrimination problem, discuss
the remedies available to an aggrieved plaintiff prior to the passage
of the ECOA, and finally deal with the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
itself and the Federal Reserve Board's guidelines promulgated under
its authority.
I. THE PROBLEM
We have a problem in this country. Women simply cannot get
credit--either commercial credit, credit for home loans, or consumer
credit--on the same basis as men.5 Banks, savings and loans associa-
tions, credit card companies, retail companies, retail stores and even
the Federal government discriminate against women-in all stages of
life-whether single, married, divorced or widowed; with or without
children; rich or poor; young or old.6
The fact is that the credit industry is a relatively closed commun-
ity, operated by white male decision makers, and its standards are
geared to facilitate service to white male customers. The result is
that women and minorities have great difficulty in entering this com-
munity either as decision makers or as customers.
7
Hundreds of individual complaints, along with numerous hear-
ings, investigations and studies have established a clear pattern of
discrimination across the country and on an institutionalized basis.
This discrimination has been well documented.
The National Commission on Consumer Finance (NCCF) found
that women have more difficulty in obtaining credit than men and
cited five problem areas.
1) Single women have more trouble obtaining credit than
single men.
2) Creditors generally require a woman upon marriage to
reapply for credit, usually under her husband's name. Simi-
lar reapplication is, not asked of men when they marry.
3) Creditors are often unwilling to extend credit to a married
woman in her own name.
4) Creditors are often unwilling to count the wife's income
when a couple applies for credit.
5) Women who are divorced or widowed have trouble re-
establishing credit. Women who are separated have a parti-
5. 120 CONG. Rc. 10,572 (daily ed. June 13, 1974).
6. Statement of Congresswoman Martha Griffeths, cited in K. DECROW, SEXIST JUSTICE
131 (1974).
7. Hearings on H.R. 14856, H.R. 14908 Before the Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs
of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 279
(1974) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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cularly difficult time, since the accounts may still be in the
husband's name'
A survey by the Oregon Student Public Interest Research Group
found that the women were accorded "second class status in stores
and banks," that status cut across age, race, and economic class.
But the women who had the greatest difficulty were those of child
bearing age or who were separated or divorced. In other words, those
who were most in need of credit for survival were the least likely to
receive it.9
The St. Paul Department of Human Rights conducted an experi-
ment in which they sent a man and woman of identical qualifications
to obtain a car loan. Out of 23 banks included in the test, 39 percent
were found to have discrepancies in their loan policies and nine were
found to be outright discriminatory.' 0
A United States Commission on Civil Rights study of mortgage
lending practices concluded that for women, the mortgage finance
system is a stacked deck-stacked sometimes inadvertently, often
unthinkingly but stacked none the less. Women by their status as
women are openly considered questionable risks by mortgage lend-
ers. After interviews with over 75 federal and city housing special-
ists, the Commission was able to discern a distinct pattern of dis-
criminatory practices."
For the woman seeking credit as a consumer, the situation is
difficult, but where she is seeking credit as an entrepreneur her
difficulties are compounded. A report by the District of Columbia Ad-
visory Commission to the U. S. Commission on Civil Rights found
that unavailability of capital was the biggest problem faced by wo-
men going into business for themselves. In fiscal 1973, of the 33,948
loans made by the Small Business Administration, only 123 went
to women.1
2
The practices creditors use that can result in a discriminatory
impact are many and varied. A report by the Senate Committee on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs identified 13 common discrimin-
atory practices used by creditors and found they were prevelant in
every type of consumer credit transaction. " They are as follows:
1. Holding men and women to different standards in deter-
mining credit worthiness, e.g. minimum salary level (without
8. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN THE UNITED
STATES 152-53 (1972).
9. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 37, col. 1.
10. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 35, col. 1.
11. Hearings, &upra note 7, at 39 (statement of Hon. Arthur S. Flemming, U.S. Comm'n
on Civil Rights, Chairman).
12. Hearings, supra note 7, at 472 (statement of Congresswoman Barbara Jordan).
13. S. R P. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 16-17 (1973).
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regard to individual obligations), length of employment,
length of residence, etc.'14
2. Requiring a newly married woman whose credit has oth-
erwise remained the same to reapply for credit as a new ap-
plicant.
3. Refusing to extend credit to a married woman in her own
name even though she would be credit worthy if unmarried.
4. Refusing to count a wife's income when a married couple
applies for credit, including jointly held credit cards, loans
and mortgage loans. This practice includes but is not limited
to the arbitrary discounting of a wife's income.15
5. Refusing to extend credit to a newly separated or divorced
woman solely because of her change in marital status. 6
6. Arbitrary refusal to consider alimony and child support
as a valid source of income where such source is subject to
verification.
7. Applying stricter standards in the case of married appli-
cants where the wife rather than the husband is the primary
family supporter.
1 7
8. Requesting or using information about birth control prac-
tices in evaluating any credit application. 8
14. For example, a single woman and a single man applied to American Express at
about the same time. Both earned the same salary. The man received his card in six
weeks and the woman's application was rejected because she had "insufficient length of
employment." She had worked at her job longer than- had her male colleague. DRAPT CoPY
OF CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvIcEs REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTrEE ON CON-
SUMER AFFAIRS OF TIHE HoUsE COMMITEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, WOMEN AND ,CREDIT:
SYNOPSIS OF PROSPECTIVE FINDINGS OF STUDY ON AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES AGAINST SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN THE GRANTING OF CREDIT AND POSSIBLE STATE STATUTORY ORIGINS OF
UNEQUAL TREATMENT BASED PRIMARILY ON THE CREDIT APPLICANTS SEX OR MARITAL STATUS,
printed in Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 7, at 636 [Hereinafter referred to as REPORT ON
WOMEN AND CREDIT].
15. A survey of savings and loan associations by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
studies what credit would be allowed a working wife's Income on a mortgage. The wife
was 25 years old, had two, children and worked full time as a secretary. Only 22% of
those surveyed would count all of the wife's income, 25% would recognize none and the
rest discounted part of her salary. This was despite the fact that the Labor Department's
projections showed she would probably not have any more children and that she would
continue working for another 40 years. Hearings, supra note 7, at 313 (remarks of Eugene
H. Adams, Chairman of the Governing Council, Am. Bankers Assoc.).
. In another case, a married couple whose combined incomes totalled $14,000 a year
were denied a VHA mortgage on a $19,900 house. The Bank refused to count any of the
wife's $4,500 income. She noted that her income was counted 100% for income tax pur-
poses by the State of Delaware and the federal government. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at
35, col. 2.
16. A separated woman who wished to open a credit account at Sears was asked to
come in and "discuss" her situation before credit would be granted. A full time nurse
was unable to obtain credit. A woman who had been divorced 8 years, had an income of
$10,000 and owned two cars was refused an F.H.A. mortgage even though at the time her
monthly rental payments were larger than the mortgage payments would have been. A
newly divorced woman wanted to reapply for credit in her own name at a department
store. She was told to attach a copy of her divorce decree to the application because her
prior credit history would not be considered. It was, in effect, a new application.
A newly divorced woman with sole ownership of a new Volvo automobile, sole title
to a $38,000 home, $30,000 in alimony and child support and $3,000 in savings was denied
a Master Charge account by her bank. When she applied for a charge card at a Detroit
department store she was asked for the names of her husband and lawyer-"Just to be
safe." She was quoted as saying: "For years, I handled all the bills for the household. I
am the one who insured our excellent credit rating except that it turned out to be 'his'
not 'ours'." N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 35, col. 1.
17. A woman who was the sole support of her husband and who earned $16,000 a year
was denied a small business loan because she did not have her husband's authorization.
REPORT ON WOMEN AND CREDIT, printed in Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 7, at 697.
18. A Delaware bank refused to Include a wife's income in determining a mortgage loaj.
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9. Requesting or using information concerning the credit
worthiness of a spouse where an otherwise credit worthy
married woman applies for credit as an individual.1 9
10. Refusing to issue separate accounts to married persons
where each would be credit worthy if unmarried.2"
11. Considering as "dependents" spouses who are employed
and not actually dependent on the applicant.
12. Use of credit scoring systems that apply different values
depending on sex or marital status.
13. Altering an individuals credit rating on the basis of the
credit rating of the spouse.
The problem is one of no small magnitude. Will Rogers once sug-
gested a solution for traffic jams-keep every car off the road until
it's paid for. The cure illustrates the extent to which our economy is
dependent on credit.21 Credit is involved in an almost endless variety
of transactions reaching from the medical delivery of the newborn to
the rituals associated with the burial of the dead.
22 The use of credit
helps in emergency situations, management of money, and in pro-
viding a higher standard of living. More than one half of the families
in this country make use of consumer credit. 28 Credit truly has be-
come the American way of life.
Those who are not able to secure credit are at a material dis-
advantage. And when a worthy applicant is denied credit, the impli-
cations of that denial go far beyond the one transaction, working to
the detriment of applicants and creditors alike.
The most immediate impact will be, of course, on the woman
herself. The availability of credit often determines an individual's
effective range of social choice and influences such basic life matters
as the selection of occupation or housing. It has even been suggested
They said they would consider half of her salarly if she produced a medical certificate of
her sterilization. If her husband had a vasectomy though, her income would still not be
counted because "you can still get pregnant." The requirement of a "baby letter" or proof
of inability to bear children is a common creditor practice. The age of 38 is what most
creditors consider the frontier of safety, when they will no longer require such proof.
N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 35, col. 2.
19. It isn't just spouses that are required to "vouch" for a woman's credit worthiness.
Often single women cannot get a loan without a male co-signer. In one case a woman in
her 40's who as head of the household wanted to buy a house for herself and her children
could not get a mortgage without the signature of her 70 year old father who was living
on a pension. S. REP. No. 93-278, 93d Cong., 1st Seas. 17 (1973).
20. Even lawyers are not immune from this creditor practice. A financially independent
attorney making in excess of $25,000 a year could not get a one year $3,000 car loan
without her husband's signature. Particularly galling was the fact that her secretary, who
made considerably less, received a loan about the same time. The branch manager said
the lawyer probably would have received the loan had she been single. N.Y. Times, Mar.
29, 1973, at 99, col. 8.
Another woman was denied a Diner's Club card because her husband's salary was
too low. Her income was adequate and she was the sole applicant. REPORT ON WOMEN
AND CamDrr, printed in Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 7, at 637.
21. Hearings, supra note 7, at 472 (statement of Congresswoman Barbara Jordan).
22. Hearings to Amend the Equal Credit Opportunity Act of 1974, H.R. 3386, Before the
Subcommittee on Consumer Affairs of the House Committee on Banking, Currency and
Housing, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., 98-39 (1975) (statement of Hon. Arthur S. Fleming, U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Chairman) [hereinafter cited as Hearings to Amend].
21. Hearings, supra note 7, at 427 (statement of Congresswoman Barbara Jordan).
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that the availability of credit can affect an individual's ability to
exercise substantive civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. 24 The
denial of credit on the basis of an immutable characteristic impedes
an individual's ability to function fully within the stream of com-
merce. And such inability may be accompanied by a sense of per-
sonal humiliation and frustration, the implications of which may ex-
tend far beyond the economic sphere.
25
The arbitrary denial of credit will also affect the woman's family.
Assume a woman who is the head of a household is denied a mort-
gage loan. Not only will she be denied the opportunity to build equity
and develop her credit history, but her family will be forced to live
in cramped quarters. The husband of a married woman may also
be adversely affected. If his wife's income is not counted or is dis-
counted, in a credit application, it may mean the financial responsi-
bility for the family will fall disproportionately heavily on him.
It is not in the best interest of the creditors themselves to dis-
criminate against women in the granting of credit. Discrimination
in credit is unlike discrimination in wages. While an employer may
believe he is saving money by not paying women on an equal ba-
sis, the financial gains to those who discriminate in credit are low
or negative. It is in the economic interest of a creditor to do business
with the most reliable borrowers or purchasers whether they are
men or women. One credit executive put it this way:
Today many women have jobs with substantial income and
expected tenure, and thus represent an excellent market for
financial services. It's simply good business to serve this
market fairly and equally-without regard to consideration
of sex.2 6
Discriminatory practices in the credit industry may have conse-
quences for the economy as a whole. The credit industry is big busi-
ness in this country. The total outstanding consumer credit increased
from 23 billion in 1950 to 180 billion in 1973. 27 The national production
of goods and services is constricted whenever commercial financing,
a cornerstone of the economy, is either denied or offered under un-
reasonable conditions to a segment of the population or business com-
munity.28 In fact, in explaining the purpose of the Equal Credit Op-
portunity Act, it was recognized that economic stabilization would
24. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 39 (statement of Arthur S. Fleming, U.S.
Comm'n on Civil Rights, Chairman).
25: Hearings, supra note 7, at 35 (statement of Jeffrey M. Bucher, Member, Bd. of
Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys.).
26. N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 1973, at 23, col. 8.
27. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 110 (statement of Richard F. Ehlers on behalf
of the Nat. Retail Merchants Ass'n).
28. Hearings, supra note 7, at 35 (statement of J. Stanley Pottinger, Ass't Att'y Gen.,
Civil Rights Dlv.).
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be enhanced and competition awmong the various financial institu-
tions and firms engaged in the extension of credit would be streng-
thened by an absence of discrimination on the basis of sex or mari-
tal status.29 Senator Stevens, one of the promoters of the ECOA, ex-
pressed a similar viewpoint:
These bills will benefit not only these families themselves
but also, ultimately, the entire business community. Addi-
tional income will be generated. Construction will increase.
More consumer goods will be produced as the result of this
legislation. It will permeate throughout the economy.3 0
If sex based discrimination in granting of credit is unfair to women,
unprofitable for creditors, and detrimental to the economy, why does
it persist?
A. THE CAUSES
The difficulty in pinpointing the causes of discrimination in the
granting of credit arises out of the fact that the extension or with-
holding of credit is, itself, a discriminatory process. There is no le-
gal right to receive credit and the creation of such a right may well
be inconsistent with a free enterprise system. The decision to grant
or deny credit is based on qualitative distinctions. It is a discerning,
evaluative process that lacks precision. And, invariably, the sub-
jective element plays a major role in determining whether credit
will be granted. Even the most complete record of credit denial
doesn't always indicate the most important reason for the decision.3 1
Given the arbitrary nature of the credit decision, it is still
possible to identify sex-based discrimination. Discrimination in the
extension of credit occurs when a credit applicant is not evaluated
pursuant to a creditor's ordinary criteria, but is judged-and fre-
quently denied credit-not individually but because of membership
in a class S2 The determination of credit worthiness may be a dis-
criminatory process but the decisions should be based on the most
realistic criteria available.
The investigations of the credit industry found that discrimina-
tion is premised on two factors-outmoded assumptions about the
credit worthiness of women and concern about state property laws
which limit, or seem to limit, the ability of women to incur debt.
Although there is no evidence, direct or indirect, that women
are poorer credit risks than men, creditors by and large do not con-
sider women to be credit worthy. A substantial majority of them
29. Equal Credit Protection Act, Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, tit. VII, § 502.
30. 119 CONG. REc. 25,421 (remarks of Senator Stevens).
31. See Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 12.
32. S. RE P . No. 98-278, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., 19 (1973).
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cling to stereotypes of women based on assumptions which have long
since outlived their truth or utility. Creditors often view women as
unstable, unreliable and in need of male protection. They assume
that women do not really need to work, and work only for "pin mon-
ey" or to relieve the boredom. of housework. They have serious
doubts about women's job continuity. They believe single women will
quit work to get married and that married women will quit work
to have children. Many creditors consider marital status as a reli-
able indicator of stability and credit worthiness.84 The divorced, se-
parated, or widowed woman is considered a bad credit risk because
she is without male support, financial or otherwise. 85
Statistical evidence indicates that these assumptions are far
from correct. Today there is little question that women work for
the same reason men do-to earn the income for their labor. Women
now account for about 44 percent of the work force.3 6 Nearly two-
thirds of all women workers are single, divorced, widowed, separated
or have husbands that earn less than $7,000 a year.3 7 More than
33. Hearings, supra note 7, at 132-133 (statement of Arthur S. Fleming, U.S. Comm'n
on Civil Rights, Chairman).
34. Creditors often feel that a consumer who is married and has a family evidences
more stability than a consumer who is single because among other things, he or she has
responsibilities holding him or her to obligations. Hearings on the Economic Problems o)
Women Before the Joint Economic Committee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 198 (1973) (state-
ment of William L. Taylor, Dir., Center for Nat. Policy Review, School of Law, Catholic
University). One credit executive said:
It is well documented that one of the principal reasons for consumer bank-
ruptcies is separation, divorce, and other marital difficulties. Thus marital
status has a direct relationship to such factors as the ability to repay, the
individual's stability and willingness to repay.
Obviously one's marital status, for example, divorced and maintaining two
homes, may reflect on his credit worthiness.
Hearings, supra note 7. at 92 (statement of Thomas Haeussler, Pres. and Chief Exec.,
Capital Financial Services, Inc.).
A credit executive from Montgomery Ward Company estimated that for his com-
pany to eliminate the factor of marital status would cost half a million dollars annually
in increased bad debt and lost profit. He felt that to eliminate that factor would "sub-
stantially increase our bad debt losses." Business Week, May 19, 1975, at 43-4.
The fact of the marriage is often irrelevant. What ought to be relevant is the number
of dependents and fixed cost of applicant's expenses or the net amount of a person's ex-
pendible income. The reliance on marriage as an indicator of stability would seem to be
misplaced in view of the current divorce rate. There is now one divorce for nearly every
two marriages in the U.S. Newsweek, Sept. 22, 1975, at 48, col. 1. In the face of sta-
tistics like this there is good reason to believe the debt will outlive the marriage. And
in any event the hearings establish that no marital status is foolproof, and the main diffi-
culty is not whether one is married or divorced, single or separated, newly-wed or widowed
but whether the applicant is a woman. REPORT ON WOMEN AND CREDrr, printed in Hearings,
pt. 2, supra note 7, at 637. At least one creditor has acknowledged that inquiry into marital
status is not necessary. Joel Esquith, senior vice-president and controller for Macy's De-
partment Store, California, was quoted as saying: "We get enough information to grant
credit without asking if someone is married. Those kinds of questions are from the 1930's
and 1940's when very few women worked." BusrnEss WE K, May 19, 1975, at 44.
35. While the married woman is a non-person when it comes to credit, the separated
woman runs into another kind of Catch-22. A store won't extend credit because a credit
check will frequently find that she has no credit history at all. The entire credit history
belongs to the husband. N.Y. Times, Mar. 25, 1973, at 35, col. 1. Even if a woman is re-
ceiving "male support" in the form of alimony, child support or maintenance payments,
creditors refuse to consider it as income because it is thought to be unreliable.
36. Hearings, supra note 7, at 314 (remarks by Eugene H. Adams, Chairman of the
Governing Council, Amer. Bankers Assoc.).
37. Hearing on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic Committee,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 2 (1973).
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fifteen million households are headed and supported by women. 8
When a woman marries, it does not necessarily mean her employ-
ment will end. In families consisting of a husband and wife, the wife
continues working in 55 percent of the cases and that accounts for
about 21 million families.39 And when a woman has children, it doesn't
mean her working days are over. The number of mothers in the
work force increased from 21.6 percent in 1950 to 38.2 percent in
1967.40 Now 51 percent of American mothers with school age children
are working outside the home, two-thirds of them at full time jobs.41
In families with children under six, one mother in three is holding
an outside job.
42
The figures on job continuity also belie the assumptions on which
creditors have relied. A woman who remains single can be expected
to work for 45 years-a longer work life than the average man has.43
A 35 year old widow can be expected to work 29 more years." A
woman divorced and working at age 35 can be expected to work for
another 27 years.
45
Married women are also establishing continuity in their employ-
ment. The President's Manpower Report of 1973 found that women
are indicating a far greater propensity to work and avoid in-
terruption in their careers. When women do have children
they will probably have no more than two-and once they've
had these children, they are likely to return to work. Today
one third of all mothers with pre-school age children work
and one half with school age children return to their ca-
reers.
46
The Federal Housing Authority has already recognized that preg-
nancy does not mean a permanent interruption of employment. Its
regulations include the following:
The principal element of mortgage risk in allowing the
income of working wives as effective income is the possibility
of its interruption by maternity leave. Most employers recog-
nize this possibility and provide for maternity leave with
job retention as an inducement for employment for return-
ing to work. Any failure to do so after maternity leave would
probably be due to causes which would be unpredictable and
38. Hearings, supra note 7, at 314 (remarks by Eugene H. Adams, Chairman of the
Governing Council, Amer. Bankers Assoc.).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Nnwswaxe, Sept. 22, 1975, at 55, col. 1.
42. Id.
43. Hearings, supra note 7, at 310 (remarks by Eugene H. Adams, Chairman of the
Governing Council, Amer. Bankers Assoc.).
44. Id. at 312.
45. Id.
46. PREsmENT'S MANPOWER REPORT OF 1973, cited in Hearings, supra note 7, at 210;
see N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1974, at 1, col. 6.
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would represent such a very small percentage or volume
that it could be accepted as a calculated risk.
47
While there have not been many studies on the credit worthiness
of women, those that have been done establish that women are good
credit risks.48 A study conducted by David Durand, for the National
Bureau of Economic Research, found that women are better credit
risks than men, a fact he said seemed puzzling to a number of cre-
dit executives. 49 In the area of personal borrower characteristics Du-
rand concluded,
The classification of borrowers by sex and marital status
indicate that women are better credit risks than men; and the
superiority appears to be statistically significant. No signifi-
cant difference, however, is evident between the risk charac-
teristics of married and single persons.60
Similarly, another study done for the National Bureau of Economic
Research found no relationship between marital status and mort-
gage loan risk.51 One program that provided home improvement loans
to elderly and low income families, many of whom were headed by
women, reported a delinquency rate of only 4 percent and no fore-
closures . 2 Most significantly, of the families headed by women there
was only a 2 percent delinquency rate. The program's director be-
lieves female heads of families demonstrate better fiscal responsi-
bility than other households.53
Finally, a study conducted by the Center for Women Policy Stu-
dies concluded that there is no justification for dealing with men
and women differently in credit matters.
5 4
When creditors rely on stereotyped assumptions about women
in their credit decisions, these assumptions can be readily countered
with factual evidence. The National Commission on Consumer Fi-
nance gives its approval to the use of statistical data in calculating
47. Hearings, supra note 7, at 312 (remarks by Eugene H. Adams, Chairman of the
Governing Council, Amer. Bankers Assoc.).
48. The credit industry is not required by any federal agency to keep statistics on the
number of credit applications by women, the number accepted or rejected or the reasons
for rejection.
49. Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic Committee,
93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 206 (1973) (statement of Margaret J. Gates and Jane R. Chap-
man, Co-directors, Center for Women Policy Studies), citing NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECO-
NOMIc RESEARcH, RISK ELEMENTS IN CONSUMER INSTALLMENT FINANCING at 74 (D. Durand,
Tech. Ed., 1941).
50. Id.
51. Hearings on the Economic Problems of Women Before the Joint Economic Commit-
tee, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 206 (1979) (statement of Margaret J. Gates and Jane R. Chap-
man, Co-directors, Center for Women Policy Studies), citing NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECO-
NomIC RESEARcH, HOME MORTGAGE AND FORECLOSURE at 74 (J. Herzog & J. Earley, 1971).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 119 CoNG. REC. 25,422 (1973) (remarks by Senators Williams).
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the probability of repayment.55 When the evidence and statistics are
reviewed, there appears to be no basis for discriminating against
women in the extension of credit.
Many creditors claim, however, that discriminatory practices are
due not to outmoded assumptions but to the existence of state pro-
perty laws. Many of these state laws dealing with personal property
rights are outdated. They are based on historical concepts which
lag behind prevailing attitudes. The laws which seem to hinder the
extension of credit to women are support laws, domestic relations
laws, community property laws, and multiple agreement laws.5 6 It
should be noted at the outset that these laws apply only to married
women. They in no way affect the personal property rights of single
women.
The support laws, which have been enacted in all 50 states, place
the financial responsibility for maintaining the family unit on the
husband.5 7 The husband is required to furnish the wife with necessities.
The credit history, salary or professional standing of the wife in no
way affect this duty of support. The husband usually has the primary
responsibility for the support of children as well. As a result, a credi-
tor who extends credit to a married woman can always reach the
assets of her husband for satisfaction of the debt by showing that
the goods or services were necessities. Creditors usually are thinking
in terms of the support laws when they require a husband's signature
on a wife's credit application. While the support laws appear to in-
hibit the extension of credit to married women upon their own ac-
count, they do not necessarily affect the woman who has her own
income and property. All a creditor need require before granting
a woman credit in her own right is a showing that she has suffici-
55. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINANCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES at 155-156 (1972) :
The Commission finds that stastically-based discrimination is as ac-
ceptable in extending consumer credit as it Is in underwriting insurance.
This form of discrimination derives estimates from past experience about
probabilities that a member of a class is likely to die, have an accident, or
not pay obligations. Assessing these possibilities, it is appropriate that 30-
year old men pay lower life insurance premiums than men aged 60; that
young women drivers pay lower auto insurance premiums than young men
drivers; and that individuals with steady employment, good payment records,
and savings accounts pay lower finance charges (or have more credit avail-
able) than consumers with a lower probability of repaying their debts.
56. The limitations of this note do not permit an extensive study of state property laws
which may affect the availability of credit to women. For a more thorough treatment see
Gates, supra note 2; CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOM-
MITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY,
WOMEN AND CREDIT: A 50-STATE STUDY OF LAWS IN THE AREA OF MARIED WOMEN'S PROP-
ERTY RIGHTS, SUPPORT LAWS, DIvoRcE, EXEMPTION, HOMESTEAD, DOWER AND CURTESY FOR
PURPOSE OF IDENTIFYING POssIBLE STATUTORY ORIGINS OF DISCRIMINATION, IN THE GRANTING
OF CREDIT WHEN SUCH TREATMENT IS BASED PRIMARILY ON SEX OR MARITAL STATUS (1974),
printed in Hearings, supra note 7, pt. 8, at 727.
57. North Dakota's support statute is N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-03 (1960). The husband
must support himself and his wife out of his property and his labor. The wife must sup-
port the husband when he has not deserted her, out of her separate property, when he
has no separate property and he is unable from infirmity to support himself.
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ent income and assets of her own to secure repayment. Thus a
married woman can be treated like any other credit applicant with
the same qualifications.8
There are two other laws which should minimize the effect of
the support laws. The Married Woman's Property Act has been en-
acted in all 50 states and generally provides that a married woman's
earnings are her own separate property and that she can enter con-
tracts and sue and be sued. 9 In effect, this statute removes any com-
mon law disabilities and establishes a married woman as a finan-
cially independent person. The other law which tempers the support
law is the Family Expense statute, enacted in 22 states, which im-
poses liability on the wife as well as the husband for her family's
well being. 60 In addition it is worth noting that a number of state
laws provide that either spouse can be held liable for maintenance
or alimony on a temporary or permanent basis.61
There are eight states that have community property laws." In
these states property that is acquired after the marriage becomes the
property of the marriage community regardless of who acquired the
property. The husband is deemed the sole manager of the property
and the wife has no control of the property during the marriage.
Thus the wife would have no property of her own to which a credi-
tor could look for satisfaction of a debt. Most of these laws have
58. See Gates, supra note 3.
59. North Dakota's Married Women's Property Act Is N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-05 (1960).
The wife after marriage has with respect to property, contracts, and torts, the same lia-
bilities as before marriage, including liability to suit by her husband. In all actions by or
against her, she shall sue and be sued in her own name.
60. North Dakota's Family Expense Statute is N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-08 (1960):
The separate and mutual rights and liabilities of a husband and wife
are as follows:
1. Neither the husband nor the wife as such is answerable for the acts
of the other;
2. The earnings of the wife are not liable for the debts of the husband,
and the earnings and accumulations of the wife and of her minor children
living with her or in her custody, while she is living separate from her hus-
band, are the separate property of the wife;
3. The husband and wife are liable jointly and severally for any debts
contracted by either, while living together, for necessary household supplies
of food, clothing and fuel, and for shelter for themselves and family, and
for the education of their minor children;
4. The separate property of the husband is not liable for the debts of
the wife; and
5. The separate property of the wife is not liable for the debts of her
husband, but is liable for her own debts contracted before or after marriage.
61. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 25-319 (Supp. 1973); CAL. Civ. CODE § 4357 (West Supp
1975) ; CoLo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10-114 (1973); ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 40, § 16 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1975); IOWA CoD ANN. § 598.11 (Supp. 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1607
(1964) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 518.14, .57, .62 (1975) ; N.H. Rv. STAT. ANN. §§ 458.16 to
.18 (Supp. 1973), § 459.19 (1968) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1975); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 22-7-6 (Supp. 1973); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-11.2, -16.9 (Supp. 1974); N.D. CENT.
COos §§ 14-06-02 to -03 (1960); OHIO Rxv. CODE ANN. §§ 3105.18, 3109.05 (Page Supp.
1974) ; OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 1276 (Supp. 1974) ; ORE. REv. STAT. § 107.105 (1973) ; TEx.
FAM. CODE § 3.59 (1975) ; UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 30-3-3 to -5 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-107 (1975).
62. Awiz. 1xv. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-211 to -217 (Supp. 1973) ; CAL. Civ- CODE § 5000-38
(West Supp. 1975) ; IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 39-901 to -912 (Supp. 1975) ; LA. Crv. CODE arts.
2325-2437 (West 1971) ; Nsv. lv. STAT. ANN. §§ 123.220 to -. 260 (1973) ; N.M. STAT. ANN.
ch. 57-4A (Supp. 1973); TEX. FAM. CODE ch. 5 (1975); WASH. REV. CODS ch. 26.16 (1961).
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been modified, however, so that now a woman can obligate her own
property and earnings. 3 In California, a wife must not commingle her
earnings to maintain control over her earnings.6 Thus, community
property laws are not really a barrier to the extension of credit to
women.
Multiple agreement laws prevent a creditor from maintaining
separate accounts for a husband and wife in order to charge a higher
interest rate on the amount of debt outstanding.65 Instead of two
small loans with a higher interest rate, the creditor is required to
extend one larger loan with a lower interest rate. While these laws
seek to protect consumers from unscrupulous practices, they also pre-
vent a wife from receiving a loan from the same institution as her
husband. The National Commission on Consumer Finance has sug-
gested that the solution to the problem may be to allow a husband
and wife to have separate accounts if they wish so long as full dis-
closure of possible additional costs is provided to them.6s
While state property laws do not prohibit the extension of cre-
dit to a married woman in her own right, there are a number of
state laws which appear to require the creditor to inquire as to the
marital status of an applicant for his own protection. These laws are
the wage assignment laws, tenancy by the entirety and common
law dower .
7
Ten states have wage assignment laws requiring either spouse to
have the consent of the other before assigning wages as collateral
for a debt6s and seven states require that a husband obtain his wife's
signature.6 9
In the 22 states that have tenancy by the entirety, a creditor may
need to have the signature of both spouses before he can use the pro-
63. ARIz. REv. STAT. § 25-214 (Supp. 1973) ; CAL. CIrv. CODE §§ 5125, 5127.5 (West Supp.
1975) LA. CIrv. CODE arts. 3581-3585 (Supp. 1975) ; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-4A-7.1 (Supp.
1973) ; Tnx. FAM. CODE § 5.22 (1975) ; WASH. REv. CODE § 26.16.030 (Supp. 1974).
Louisiana was the last state to enact a provision allowing a woman to maintain
control over her earnings, having done so in July, 1975. Prior to that enactment a woman
could still achieve the same result by entering an antenuptial agreement to that effect.
LA. Crv. CODE art. 2404 (West 1971).
64. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 5124 (West 1970).
65. For a detailed treatment of this area see CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERvica REPORT
PREPARED FOR THE SUBcOMMITTEE ON CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON
BANKING AND CURRENCY, A 50-STATE STUDY OF GRADUATED INTEREST RATE CEILING LAWS
AFFECTING THE ABILITY OF MARRIED WOMEN TO OBTAIN CREDIT, reprinted in Hearings, pt. 2.
uraur note 7, at 681.
66. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CONSUMER FINAwCE, CONSUMER CREDIT IN
THE UNITED STATES 153 (1972).
67. Gates, supra note 2, at 428
68. AUz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 6-631 (1974) ; COLO. REv. STAT. § 8-9-104 (1967); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 409-20 (1968); MD. CODE ANN. art. 8, § 15-302(b) (1975) ; NED. REV. STAT.
§ 45-144 (1974) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANNe. § 19-25-33 (1968) ; VT. STAT. ANN. § 8-2229 (1971) ;
VA. CODE ANN. 6.1-289 (1973) ; WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.48.100 (Supp. 1975) ; Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 241.09 (Supp. 1975).
69. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 81-317 (1960) ; IND. STAT. ANN. § 40-208 (1965); MASS. ANN.
LAW. ch 154, § 2 (Supp. 1975), § 3 (1958) ; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.07 (1974) ; MONT.
REV. CODE ANN. § 41-1506 (1961) ; PA. STAT. ANN. § 43-274 (1964) ; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §
27-202 (1967).
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perty for security. If a creditor is not aware that a credit applicant
is married and does not obtain the signature of the spouse, it could
preclude a levy on the property in the event of default.
7 0
Common law dower exists in 20 states.7 1 If a husband alone exe-
cutes a non-purchase money mortgage on his land, his wife's in-
choate dower is superior to the rights of the mortgagee. Thui'a hus-
band cannot mortgage his property without his wife's signature. Sim-
ilarly, where curtesy exists a wife must have her husband's signa-
ture to convey real property."'
The need for disclosure of marital status as required by state
law and the need for non-discriminatory credit practices can be re-
conciled when the fact of marital status is limited to a procedural
protection of obtaining joint signatures and does not implicate the
credit worthiness of the married woman.
B. REMEDIES
The remedies available to an aggrieved credit applicant on the
federal level are minimal and largely untried. There are, however,
two constitutional grounds on which a plaintiff might proceed-equal
protection and freedom of contract.
The equal protection clause of the 14th amendment guarantees
equality of right and forbids unequal governmental action.73 It ap-
plies, however, only to state action. It is difficult to determine where
private action ends and state action begins since the Supreme Court
has characterized state action on a case by case basis rather than
on the basis of a specific set of criteria. Thus a threshold question is
whether there is sufficient state involvement in creditors' discrimina-
tion to raise a claim under the equal protection clause. The requi-
site state action could possibly be found in the case of savings and
loan institutions and banks but it is doubtful whether other creditors
70. See R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 623 (1968) ; Huber, Creditors' Rights
in Tenancies by the Entireties, 1 B.C. IND. Com. L. REv. 197 (1960).
71. ALA. CODE tit. 34 § 40 (1958) ; ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-201 (1971) CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 46-12 (Supp. 1975); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. ANN. § 19-102 (1967); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
731.34 (Supp. 1975-76) ; HAWAII REV. LAWS § 533-1 (Supp. 1974) ; KY. REv. STAT.. § 392.020
(1970) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 189, § 1 (Supp. 1975) ; MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §
558.1 (1967) ; MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 22-101 (1967) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 8A:35-1 k(1963)
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2103.02 (1968) ; PA. STAT. ANN., tit. 20, § 1.5(a) (Purdon Supp.
1972) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 33-4-1 (1970) ; S.C. CODE ANN. § 19-153 (1962) ; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 31-601 (1955) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 74-4-3 (1953) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
461 (1974) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 64.1-19 1973) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 43-1-1 (1966) ; Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 861.03 (1971).
72. See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT PREPARED FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON
CONSUMER AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, THE POSSIBLE
IMPACT OF STATE DOWER AND CURTESY LAWS ON THE PROBLEM OF SEX DISCRIMINATION IN
GRANTING CREDIT AND LOANS, printed in Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 7, at 613.
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1 reads in part: "No state shall make or enforce any
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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could be reached.14 Private creditors could possibly be reached if a
discriminatory practice could be traced to a specific state statute
upon which a creditor is basing his decision, thus making the law
operate indirectly to cause credit discrimination on the basis of
sex.
7 5
Another problem in a 14th amendment claim is the standard of
review the Court would use, assuming the requisite state action could
be established. 76 If the Court uses the "rational basis" test, the claim
would very likely be defeated as that test is easily satisfied. While
the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson7 7 did seem to be moving toward
treating sex as a suspect classification and thus subject to strict
judicial scrutiny, there is still no clear indication of how far a court
will go in finding differential treatment on the basis of sex invalid
under the 14th amendment .
7
In no 14th amendment case alleging discrimination on ac-
count of sex, has the United States Supreme Court held that
a law classifying persons on the basis of sex was unreason-
ble and therefore unconstitutional. 79
Insofar as mandatory state support laws or similar statutes may
be a direct or an indirect cause of credit discrimination, there re-
mains an untried argument which might remedy some of the financial
inequities in the marital relationship to which credit problems can
be ascribed-the freedom of contract clause.8 0 Yet the judiciary has
repeatedly held that a marriage contract is not within the purview of
the contract clause. This position was first stated in an 1888 case,
Maynard v. Hill: 81
It is also be to observed that, whilst marriage is often
termed by text writers and in decisions of courts a civil con-
74. Gates, supra note 2, at 422. But see The Discredited American: Woman: Sex Dis-
crimination in Cdnsumer Credit, 6 CALIF. DAVIS L. REv. 61, 78-9 (1973).
75. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT, WOMEN AND CREDIT. AVAILABLE LEGAL
REMEDIEs AGAINST DISCRIMINATION PRACTIcES (1974), printec in Hearings, pt. 2, supra
note 7, at 593 [hereinafter cited as REPORT ON AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES].
76. The Court has been considered to use two standards of review in deciding equal
protection cases. With the old standard of review the Court examines the statute on its
face to determine if it is reasonably related to a legitimate legislative end. The new stan-
dard of review goes beyond the wording of the statute. Whenever a "suspect classifica-
tion" or "fundamental right" is involved it will trigger a strict scrutiny to see if the
statute is unconstitutional. See generally B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUONAL LAW 285-96 (1972).
77. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
78. In Frontiero, the Court declared unconstitutional an Air Force Regulation denying to
dependents of servicewomen benefits granted to dependents of servicemen. A plurality of
the Court found that any statutory scheme which drew a sharp line between sexes solely
for the purpose of administrative convenience was unconstitutional. Id. at 690-91. Thus
four of the Justices determined that sex discrimination was a suspect classification and
must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.
79. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS at 34 (1963), cited in
The Discredited American Woman, supra note 74, at 75.
80. REPORT ON AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES, printed in Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 7, at
594.
81. 125 U.S. 190 (1888).
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tract-generally to indicate that it must be founded upon
the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religi-
ous ceremony for its solemnization-it is something more than
a mere contract. The consent of the parties is of course es-
sential to its existence, but when the contract to marry is
executed by the marriage, a relation between the parties is
created which they cannot change. Other contracts may be
modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon
the consent of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation
once formed, the law steps in and holds the parties to vari-
ous obligations and liabilities. It is an institution, in the main-
tenance of which in its purity -the public is deeply interested,
for it is the foundation of the family and of society, without
which there would neither civilization nor progress.
2
In the case of Andrews v. Andrews s Justice White noted that
divorce suits "are not merely suits between husband and wife, but
affect a public institution."' 4 Beyond the fact that marriage has never
been interpreted as being encompassed within the contract clause,
there is the general reluctance of the Supreme Court to become in-
volved in domestic relations cases. Thus the contract clause is an un-
likely remedy to the credit problem.
Although the Equal Rights Amendment is not yet law, if it is
ratified it might provide another constitutional basis on which to at-
tack credit discrimination.8 5 The ERA provides in pertinent part:
"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any state on account of sex."
A claim based on the ERA may also encounter the same diffi-
culty in proving "state action" that would be found in proving
a violation of equal protection. In addition, it may be difficult to prove
that credit is a "right" as considered in the amendment. While it is
difficult to underestimate the importance of credit in our society, it
is nevertheless still considered more of a privilege rather than a
right. Then, too, there is no specific provision within the ERA guaran-
teeing a cause of action, or minimum damages and attorney's fees. 86
While the ERA has potential as a remedy for sex-based discrimina-
tion in the credit history, it is far from clear or explicit.
It would appear that an aggrieved applicant would have more
success in seeking redress on the state, rather than on the federal
level. Twenty-six states have statutes which prohibit sex discrimina-
82. Id. at 210.
83. 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
84. Id. at 27.
85. For more information on the Equal Rights Amendment see Comment, Sex Discrimi-
nation and Equal Protection: Do We Need a Constitutional Amendmentf 84 1-H,&v. L. REV.
1499 (1971) ; Brown, Emerson, Falk and Freedman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Con-
stitutional Basis for Equal Rights for Women, 80 YALE L.J. 871 (1971).
86. REPORT ON AVAILABLE LEGAL REMEDIES, printed in Hearings, pt. 2, supra note 7, at
547.
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tion in the extension of credit."? Most of these states also prohibit
discrimination on the basis of marital status. The California statute
is unique in that it prohibits discrimination against women rather
than on the basis of sex. 8 In addition, many states have constitu-
tional provisions against sex discrimination which possibly could be
used as the basis for a credit discrimination suit. s9
All of the state laws prohibiting credit discrimination have been
passed in the last few years, and there have been no reported cases
on these laws to date. Some of them came into existence only af-
ter the enactment of the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. It is diffi-
cult to generalize about these state statutes because their provisions
and efficacy vary widely.
The types of credit transactions that are covered by the state
laws vary. Some cover only public accommodations, others cover on-
ly retail or credit card sales and still others have more comprehen-
sive coverage, including all creditors, lenders, and insurers.
The greatest variation is in the available remedies. Eleven states
provide no private right of action-only an administrative remedy,
usually in the nature of a mediation of disputes between creditors
and consumers. 90 Twelve states have statutes with a private right of
recovery, usually consisting of actual or compensatory damages. 91
Wisconsin provides for a fine of up to $1,000 in lieu of a private re-
87. ALASKA STAT. H3 18.80.230, .250 (1974) CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1812.80 (Supp. 1975);
CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 5-1-109, 24-34-405, (1974); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 36-437 (Supp.
1975) ; District of Columbia City Counsel, Human Rights Law, tit. 34, § 13.1(a) (1973) ;
ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 121 %, § 385.1 (Smith-Hurd 1975); ICAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1017,
44-1009(c) (1973) ; MD. CON. LAW ANN. §§ 12-305, 12-503 (1975) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
151B, § 4(14) (Supp. 1975); MINN. STAT. §§ 863.03.2(3), .7 (Supp. 1975); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 408.250 (Supp. 1975); N v. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 518 (Supp. 1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §
10.5-12 (Supp. 1975) ; N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a (McKinney's Supp. 1975) ; ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 30.670 (1973) ; R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 84-37-4.1 (Supp. 1974) ; S.D. COMPILED LAWS
ANN. §§ 20-13-21, 20-13-23 (Supp. 1975) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-17-103 (Supp. 1974) ; TEX.
REY. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-2,07 (Supp. 1974-75); UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (Supp.
1975) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.19 (Supp. 1975) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1211 (Supp.
1975-76), tit. 9, §§ 2362, 2410 (Supp. 1975-76) ; WASH. RED. CODE ANN. § 49.60.17v to 176
(Supp. 1974) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9 (Supp. 1975) ; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 138.20 (1974).
88. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.30 (Supp. 1975). This terminology may have been deemed
necessary to clear up any difficulties which may have arisen with respect to California's
community property laws, but it seems possible that it would render the statute susceptible
to an equal protection attack.
89. See, e.g., ALAS. CONST. art. 1, § 3 (1972) ; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 29 (1972) ; HAWAII
CONST. art. I, § 21; ILL. CON.T. art. I, § 8 (1971) ; MD. CONST. art. 46 (1972) ; N.lMl CONST.
art. 2, § 18 (1972) ; PA. CONST. art. 1, § 28 (1971) ; TEx. CONST. art. 1, § 3a (1972);
UTAH CONST. art. IV, 3 1 (1896) ; VA. CONST. art. 1, § 11 (1971); WASH. CONST. art.
XXXI, § 1 (1972) ; WYo. CONST. art. 6, § 1 (1890).
90. ALASKA STAT. §§ 18-80-100 to -145 (Supp. 1972); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 3 36-438
(Supp. 1975) ; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-1005 (Supp. 1974) ; MD. CODE ANN. § 12-631 (1975) ;
MINN. STAT. §§ 363.06, 363.071 (Supp. 1975-76) ; N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-13 to -14 (Supp.
1975-76); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296-a(6-11) (McKlnney's Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
34-37-5 (Supp. 1970) ; S.D. CoMPILED LAWS ANN. § 20-13-29 to -42 (Supp. 1975) ; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. 3 49.60-230 (Supp. 1974) ; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-10 (Supp. 1975).
91. CAL. CIT. CODE 3 1812.31 (Supp. 1975) ; COLO. REv. STAT. § 5-5-206 (1973) ; FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 725.07(2) (Supp. 1975-76) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 151B, § 4(14) (Supp.
1975) ; Mo. REv. STAT. § 408.250(3) (App. Pam. 1975) ; NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 518(18)
(Supp. 1975) ; ORg. REv. STAT. § 30.680 (1973) ; TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-17-103 (Supp. 1975) ;
T x. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-8.06 (Supp. 1975-76) ; UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-4(c)
(1978) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 50 (1971), § 2361, 2409 (Supp. 1975) ; WASH. RIv. COD
ANN. 1 49.60.225 (Supp. 1974).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
medy. 2 A minimum recovery is guaranteed by four states.93 Punitive
damages are available in four states 94 and court costs and reasonable
attorney's fees may be collected in seven states.95 Injunctive relief is
available in five states.98 The Illinois and Vermont statutes are uni-
que in that they have no enforcement provisions. 97 While these state
statutes are a step in the right direction toward granting women the
credit to which they are entitled, they are neither comprehensive
enough nor enforced enough to be effective. What was needed to re-
medy the piecemeal nature of the existing laws was an all encom-
passing federal law incorporating the strongest provisions of the lo-
cal law.
II. THE EQUAL CREDIT OPPORTUNITY ACT
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act was passed pursuant to Con-
gressional authority under the commerce clause to control credit
practices.98 The ECOA prohibits discrimination on two criteria, sex
and marital status. There is a broad exemption to this general prohi-
bition, however-the mere inquiry into marital istatus is not discri-
minatory if it is made to ascertain creditors' remedies and not for
the purpose of discrimination. 9
The purpose of the Act is not to force creditors to make unreal-
istic extensions of credit. The Congressional intent is clear:
Credit is an ordinary incident of financial transactions in
our current society; any discrimination in the availability and
extension of credit on the basis of sex or marital status is
intolerable whether it be discrimination by creditors based
on sex or marital status or state laws that indirectly im-
pede equal opportunity to credit. 100
The term credit is given a broad definition, being defined as the
right to defer payment of a debt or to incur debt and defer its payment
92. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 138.20 (1974).
93. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1812.30 (Supp. 1975) (actual damages and $500) ; CoO. REV. STAT.
§1 5-1-109, 5-5-206 (1973) (actual damages not less than $100) TEENN. CODE ANN. §
47-17-103 (Supp. 1974) (damages not less than $100) ; TEXAs REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-8.06 (Supp. 1975-76) (actual damages or $50, whichever is greater).
94. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.07(2) (Supp. 1975-76); Mo. REV. STAT. § 408.250(3) (App.
Pam. 1975) ; ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.680 (1973) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.23(b) (Supp. 1975).
95. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 5-1-109, 24-34-405 (1973) ; FLA. STAT. ANN. § 725.07(2) (Supp.
1975-76) ; MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4(14) (Supp. 1975) ; OnE. REV. STAT. § 80.680
(1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-17-103(c) (Supp. 1974) ; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art.
5069-8.06(a) (Supp. 1974) ; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 50 (1971), §§ 2361, 2409 (Supp. 1975).
96. CAL. Cirv. CODE § 1812.30 (Supp. 1975) ; NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 518 (Supp. 1975) ;
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-7-3 (Supp. 1975) ; VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-21.23 (Supp. 1975) ; WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.5 (Supp. 1974).
97. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 121 1/2, § 385.1 (Smith-Hurd 1975).
98. See Equal Credit Protection Act, Act of Oct. 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-495, it. VII,"
amending Consumer Credit Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1681 (1970) (codified at 15
U.S.C.A. § 1691 (Supp. I 1975).
99. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691(b) (Supp. I 1975).
100. S. REP. No 93-278, "pra note 13.
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or to purchase property and services and defer payment.'0 ' Thus the
provisions of the Act are not limited to consumer credit but are ap-
plicable to all forms of the extension of credit. 10 2
The ECOA does not specifically define discrimination nor does
it enumerate acts which would constitute a violation of its provi-
sions. 03  Instead it delegates substantive rule-making authority
along with power to promulgate compliance guidelines to the Fed-
eral Reserve Board. 0 4 It was thought that by vesting this power in
one regulatory agency it would avoid conflicts in rule making, in-
sure uniformity of the regulations and avoid discrimination and anti-
discrimination among credit grantors. Then, too, the Federal Reserve
Board was experienced in formulating regulations that will practi-
cally implement legislation, having done so for the Truth in Lend-
ing Act. 0 5 A creditor who in good faith relies on any rule, regula-
tion or interpretation of the Federal Reserve Board will be protected
from liability. 0 6 As will be seen later, the effectiveness of the ECOA
will depend in large measure on the detail and sensitivity of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board regulations.
One of the main concerns in any consumer legislation is the prob-
lem of effective enforcement. The experience of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 and 1968 has shown that the problems of discrimination are
such that a multiplicity of remedies, private, administrative, and
judicial are necessary to effectuate the purposes of the legislation. 0 7
Accordingly, the ECOA provides for administrative enforcement,
private enforcement actions, and class actions. 08
Administrative enforcement of the Act is given to nine federal
101. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691a(d) (Supp. I 1975).
102. While all types of credit are subject to the ECOA, certain types of specialized credit
are exempt from various regulations promulgated by the Federal Reserve Board. FEDERAL
REsERva SYSTEM Reg. B, § 202.10, 40 FED. REG. 49,309 (1975) ; see Comments to Reg. B,
40 FED. REG. 49,304-05 (1975).
103. There was considerable discussion about the advisability of defining the term dis-
criminate as well as modifying it by the use of the terms "invidious" and "arbitrary."
See generally Hearings, supra note 7, at 56-8, 92, 121-22, 335-40, 354. The Federal Reserve
REs Rv SYsTE= Reg. B, § 202.3(1), 40 FED. REG. 49,306 (1975) ; see Comments to Reg. B,
40 FED. REG. 49,298 (1975).
104. Through its board of governors who are appointed by the President, the supply of
money and credit in the United States is controlled. 12 U.S.C. § 221-522 (1970). The
Federal Reserve Board was less than enthusiastic about the duty assigned them, feeling
regulatory responsibilities detracted from their work In the monetary policy area. Hearings,
supra note 7, at 54 (testimony of Hon. Jeffrey M. Bucher, Member, Bd. of Governors of
the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
105. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-11 (1970). It was felt there were similarities between the scope
and impact of the Truth-in-Lending Act and the ECOA. Both measures seek to alter credi-
tor behavior; both superimpose a federal standard on a firmly established body of state
law. However, it was felt that telling creditors how to disclose their charges was simple
in comparison to categorizing as permissible or discriminatory all of the possible types of
inquiries involved in a credit application. Hearings, supra note 7, at 32 (testimony of Hon.
Jeffrey M. Bucher, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
106. FEDERAL RESERVE SYsTEm Reg. B, § 202.11(a), 40 FED. REG. 49,409 (1975).
107. Hearings, supra note 7, at 35 (statement of Hon. J. Stanley Pottinger, Asst. Att'y
Gen., Civil Rights Div.).
108. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1691c, 1691e(a)-(c) (Supp. I 1975).
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agencies as to creditors already under their jurisdiction.1 9 They
are: the United States Treasury Department, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board acting
directly or through the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corpor-
ation, the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, the Department of Agriculture, and the Interstate Commerce
Commission. All other creditors will be regulated by the Federal
Trade Commission.1 0 These agencies may use any of the powers
granted to them by their establishing legislation as well as any other
powers they are given by law to insure compliance with the ECOA.
For example, the FTC has available to it cease and desist orders
which prohibit unfair methods and practices in commerce."1 Pre-
sumably, such an order would be available to prohibit practices con-
stituting discrimination under the ECOA.
Although there is no specific provision authorizing the Attorney
General to act where there is a pattern or practice of discriminatory
conduct by a creditor, the Attorney General impliedly could act in
such situations if an enforcement agency formally certified a case
to the Justice Department.
1 2
Unlike the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the Equal Cred-
it Opportunity Act does not provide for a central coordinating coun-
cil that would exercise control over the enforcement agencies and
this failure to so provide is thought to be an essential weakness of
the Act."Is
The government agencies that are charged with enforcement of
the ECOA cannot realistically expect to attain total compliance by
the entire credit industry. Of necessity, private civil actions will play
a major role in deterring violators. This is as it should be since Con-
gress has always emphasized the role of self help in remedial stat-
utes.1 1 '
Both legal and equitable relief are available to the private liti-
gant. The damage recovery provisions are patterned to some ex-
tent on those of the Truth in Lending Act." 5 An aggrieved plaintiff
may be awarded an amount equal to the sum of any actual dam-
ages sustained."16 This provision has been criticized as placing an un-
109. Id. at § 1691c.
110. Id. at § 1691c(c).
111. 15 U.S.C. §§§ 41-77 (1970).
112. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 15 (statement of Congresswoman Leonor K.
Sullivan).
118. Hearings, supra note 7, at 86-7 (statement of Issle Jenkins, Assoc. Gen. Counsel,
Equal Employ. Opportunity Comm'n).
114. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 55 (statement of Sheldon Feldman, Ass't Dir.
for Special Statutes, Fed. Trade Comm'n).
115. Both Truth in Lending and the. ECOA have provisions for recovery of actual and
punitive damages as an incentive to bring an action. Hearings, supra note 7, at 70 (state-
ment of Hon. Jeffrey M. Bucher, Member, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys.).
116. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(a) (Supp. I 1975).
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due burden of proof on the credit applicants. 117 Those that oppose
this provision point out that unlike a case under the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, injuries resulting from a credit denial on a discriminatory
basis do not lend themselves to a dollar formulation. They point out
that cases under the Truth in Lending Act have shown a massive
problem in proving actual damages and that this weakness should
not be incorporated in new legislation. A minimum damage recov-
ery would, they feel, be more equitable and would provide a better
incentive for an aggrieved applicant to bring suit.
In addition to actual damages, a plaintiff. may, in the discre-
tion of the court, be awarded punitive damages up to $10,000.11 s
This punitive damage provision is available only where an appli-
cant is proceeding on an individual basis and not as a representative
of a class.""
Perhaps the most controversial provision of the ECOA is that
dealing with class actions. There was virtually no consensus of
opinion expressed in the hearings, a substantial majority of those
testifying expressed dissatisfaction with it for varying reasons. It
provides in pertinent part:
. . . any creditor who fails to comply with any requirement
imposed under this title may be liable for punitive damages
in the case of a class action in such amount as the court may
allow, except that as to each member of the class no mini-
mum recovery shall be applicable, and the total recovery
in such action shall not exceed the lesser of $100,000 or 1 per-
cent of the net worth of the creditor.
20
In determining the amount of the award the courts will consid-
er the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and
persistence of noncompliance by the creditor, the resources of the
creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent
to which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.1
2
1
Many creditors believe that this provision could result in exces-
sively large recoveries and believe that the prohibited acts are not
sufficiently defined so as to justify an award. 22 Further, it is their
117. It will be difficult for most aggrieved applicants to prove they have suffered any
actual damages. Assuming most creditors comply with the ECOA an applicant who is dis-
criminated against by one creditor should have little difficulty in locating another creditor
who could extend credit. Thus, actual damages would be limited to the cost, if any, of
locating a second creditor. And, If an alternative source of credit is not sought, it will be
virtually impossible to quantify the consumer's cost. Hearings to Amend, supra note 110,
at 55 (statement of Sheldon Feldman, Ass't Dir. for Special Statutes, Fed. Trade Comm'n).




122. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 304 (statement of Homer L. Stewart, Sr. Vice-Pres.,
Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, Tex., on behalf of the Amer. Bankers Assoc.) and at 819
(statement of Charles T. Russell, Sr. Vice-Pres., National Bank Americard, Inc., San
Francisco, Calif.).
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contention that the class action form is not suited to this type of ac-
tion because the discriminatory acts are largely individual and no
two cases would be alike. In order to insure due process to the cred-
itor, it would require extensive hearings for each member of the
class to develop the, facts peculiar to that person's case, thus encum-
bering the federal judiciary system and causing unnecessary ex-
pense.
123
On the other hand, many women's rights activists believe the
provision is an inadequate remedy because of the dollar limitations
and because of the difficulty, in general, of bringing a class action
in federal court. 124 They feel the $100,000 limit is only a -slap on the
wrist for the big credit card companies and that one percent of net
worth amounts to little or nothing to small firms. Also, considering
the difficulties of bringing a class action in federal court, partic-
ularly in view of the notice requirements imposed by Eisen v. Carlisle
and Jacqueline,125 the potential recovery is not considered worth the
effort. Women's rights activists warn that the ineffectiveness of the
class action remedy will result in a multitude of individual cases,
contributing to the expenses of plaintiff and defendant alike and add-
ing to the case load of an already over-burdened court system.
An applicant who successfully brings either a private or a class
action suit is entitled to recover costs of the action and reasonable
attorney's fees in addition to any damage award.
12
The ECOA provides that an action under its provisions may be
brought in either state or federal court within one year from the
date of the occurrence of the violation. 127 The one year statute of
limitations has been criticized on the grounds that it often takes
that long to discover that a violation has occurred and to initiate
enforcement action. 28 Consumers are often unaware of their rights
or uncertain that they have been violated and are, therefore, slow
to seek redress.2 9 Creditors, as might be expected, favor this short
statute of limitations. 30 They argue that an act of discrimination is
123. Hearings, supra note 7, at 314 (statement of Charles T. Russell, Sr. Vice-Pres.,
National BankAmericard, Inc., San Francisco, Calif.) and at 93 (statement of Thomas A.
Hauessler, Pres. and Chief Exec. Officer, Capital Financial Services, Inc., Columbus, Ohio).
124. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 355 (statement of Ann Scott, Vice-Pres. for Legisla-
tion, Nat'l Organization of Women) ; Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 15 (statement
of Congresswoman Leonor K. Sullian).
125. 417 U.S. 156 (1973). This case held that individual notice must be sent to all class
members who can be identified through reasonable effort. A petitioner must bear the cost
of the notice to members of a class-it is considered part of the ordinary burden of fi-
nancing suit.
126. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691e(e) (Supp. I 1975).
127. Id. at § 1691e(g).
128. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 13 (testimony of Congresswoman Leonor
Sullivan).
129. One of the proposed amendments to the ECOA would extend the statute of limitations
an additional year where an agency having administrative enforcement under § 704 has
begun its enforcement proceedings within a year of the violation or whenever the Attorney
General has begun a civil action within a year from the date of the occurence of the vio-
lation. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 7.
130. See Hearings, supra note 7, at 804 (statement of Homer L. Stewart, Jr., Sr. Vice
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personal in nature and is apt to be quickly felt. They feel that a long-
er time period would create an administrative burden, requiring
them to keep copious records so they could reconstruct the trans-
action in which the alleged violation took place. 131
One of the most difficult tasks in the drafting of the ECOA was
the determination of its relation to the state property laws. Unlike
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act, the ECOA does not pre-
empt state law, but merely provides a statutory basis for modify-
ing the existing state laws. This is due in large measure to the atti-
tude of the federal government to state laws. The state property
laws are so strongly considered to be within the domain of the states
that disturbing them appears more serious than, for example, dis-
turbing protective labor legislation. This attitude can be traced to
the Supreme Court's admonition in United States v. Yazell.
32
Both theory and the precedents of this Court teach
us solicitude for state entrusts, particularly in the field of
family and family-property arrangements. They should be
overridden by the federal courts only where clear and sub-
stantial interests of the National Government, which cannot
be served consistently with respect for such state interests,
will suffer major damages if the state law is applied. 3 3
The ECOA deals with its relationship to state law in a separ-
ate section. 3 4 It provides that notwithstanding the enactment of the
ECOA a creditor may still consider and apply state property laws. 135
It also provides that a creditor may request the signature of an ap-
plicant's spouse where it is necessary to create a valid lien, pass
clear title, waive inchoate rights to property or assign earnings. 36
He may not, however, use sex or marital status in the evaluation
of the credit worthiness of the applicant.
3 7
A waiver provision is provided where state laws prohibit the ex-
tension of credit to each party of a marriage. Where an applicant
applies for credit in his or her own name the state law provision
can be waived if the applicant agrees to be solely responsible for
the debt contracted.3 When a party to a marriage does apply for
a ,separate credit account, the creditor cannot aggregate or combine
Pres., Republic National Bank of Dallas, Tex., on behalf of the Amer. Bankers Assoc.)
and at 94 (statement of Thomas A. Haeussler, Pres. and Chief Exec. Officer, Capital
Financial Services, Inc., Columbus, Ohio).
131. Hearings, supra note 7, at 94 (statement of Thomas A. Haeussler, Pres. and Chief
Exec. Officer, Capital Financial Services, Inc., Columbus, Ohio).
132. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
133. Id. at 352.
134. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1691d (Supp. I 1975).
135. Id. at § 1691d(b).
136. Id. at § 1691d(b).
137. Id.
138. Id. at § 1691d(c).
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it with the account of the spouse to determine permissible loan ceil-
ings or finance charges. 139
Finally, there is a provision giving a credit applicant the option
of pursuing remedies under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act or
under a state law dealing with the same subject matter. 140 This sec-
tion is a trap for the unwary and can easily result in an unknowing
waiver of federal rights.1 41 If a consumer so much as asks a state
human rights commission or similar agency to look into a credit
discrimination complaint, he or she may be deemed to have elected
a state remedy and therefore be foreclosed from pursuing an ac-
tion under ECOA.' 4 ' It would seem to be more equitable to allow
a consumer to seek redress under both federal and state laws so
long as there is but one recovery.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act as it now stands has been
termed inadequate and poorly written. Already hearings have been
held to amend it.' 4 3 Its greatest strength is in creating a specific
cause of action where none existed previously and in raising the col-
lective consciousness of the credit community. Its greatest weak-
ness seems to be in its deference to state laws. The ECOA does no
more, in this respect, than give legislative sanction to the legal ar-
guments that have always been available to circumvent the restric-
tions of state law. While it is difficult to predict the impact of a given
law, without the benefit of administrative and judicial interpreta-
tion, it seems safe to say that the ECOA alone will probably not
make the kinds of sweeping reforms that equal rights advocates
envisioned.
However, the guidelines authorized by the Federal Reserve Board
may cause some practical changes in the extension of credit. To a
large extent, the guidelines reiterate provisions of the ECOA, but
they also propose substantial changes in four major areas: applica-
tions,'4 evaluation of applications, 14 5 credit history 4 6 and preserva-
tion of records.1
47
Under the new regulations, a creditor is prohibited from discour-
aging prospective applicants from applying for credit on the basis
of sex or marital status. 148 Where an applicant applies for an unse-
cured separate account, a creditor is not permitted to inquire into
139. Id. at § 1691d(d).
140. Id. at § 1691d(e).
141. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 16 (statement of Congresswoman Leonor K.
Sullivan).
142. Hearings to Amend, supra note 22, at 123 (testimony of Congresswoman Leonor K.
Sullivan).
143. Id.
144. FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM Reg. B, § 202.4, 40 FED. lREG. 49,307 (1975).
145. Id., § 202.5, at 49,307-08.
146. Id., § 202.5(i)-(J), 202.6(b).
147. Id., § 202.9, at 49,309.
148. Id., § 202.4(a), at 49,307.
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the applicant's marital status except in a community property state
or as required to comply with state laws governing permissible
finance charges or loan ceilings.1 9 Creditors must allow con-
sumers to open or maintain accounts in their birth-given first
name and surname' or a birth-given first name and a com-
bined surname.150 Where a designation of marital status is re-
quested, only the terms "married," "unmarried", or "sepa-
rated" may be used.15 The designation of a title, such as Mr.,
Mrs., Ms., or Miss is expressly made optional.152 Because consumers
are so often unaware of their rights, one of the most important
sections requires a creditor to give an applicant notice of the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act.'5 3 The creditor must advise an applicant that
creditors are prohibited from discriminating on the basis of sex and
marital status and inform her of the name and address of the fed-
eral agency charged with monitoring that particular credit establish-
ment.15  Recognizing that these changes may involve time and ex-
pense, the guidelines provide that they do not become effective un-
til June 30, 1976.151
The guidelines on the evaluation of applications meet head on
many of the complaints voiced by women in the various congression-
al hearings. A creditor is specifically prohibited from discounting
the income of an applicant's spouse, 56 assigning a value to sex or
marital status where a credit scoring system is used,157 or requiring
information as to birth control practices or ability to bear children.
5 8
A creditor is restricted as to the circumstances under which he may
request information about an applicant's spouse and as to the type
of information that may be requested. 59 A creditor is permitted to
inquire as to the existence of alimony, child support and mainten-
149. Id., § 202.4(c).
150. Id., § 202.4(e). This provision allows a married woman to apply for, and receive
credit in her own name, rather than her husband's name.
151. Id., § 202.4(c) (2).
152. Id., § 202.4(c) (4).
153. Id., § 202.4 (d). This provision does not apply, however, where the consumer makes
application by telephone or where she orally requests an amount of credit exceeding an
existing limit on an open-end account.
154. Id. The creditor may comply with this provision by having the notice printed on
the application form itself or by giving such notice on a separate piece of paper to the
applicant at or near the time the credit application is made. Id., § 202.4 (d) (2).
155. Id., § 202.14(d), at 49,310.
156. Id., § 202.5(e) at 49,207. This provision also prohibits the discounting of income
solely because it is derived from part-time employment. A creditor may, however, consider
the probable continuity of such income in evaluating creditworthiness. Because the majority
of the part-time work force are women, a practice of automatically discounting all part-
time Income had a disproportionately heavy impact on one sex.
157. Id., § 202.5(f).
158. Id., § 202.5(h).
159. Id., § 202.5(b). A creditor may request and consider information concerning an
applicant's spouse or former spouse only if: the spouse will be permitted to use the ac-
count; or will be contractually liable on it; or if the applicant is relying on community
property or the spouse's income as a basis for repayment of the credit requested. A credi-
tor may also inquire as to an applicant's spouse or former spouse where the applicant is
relying on alimony, child support, or maintenance payments from a spouse or former
spouse as a basis of repayment.
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ance payments, and the extent to which the applicant is relying on
them in seeking credit. The guidelines provide that a creditor must
consider these payments as income only to the extent that they are
likely to be consistently made and sets out criteria he may consider
in making his determination.160 Furthermore, a creditor is not per-
mitted to "outwait" an applicant-he is required not to delay in eval-
uating an application16 ' and is required to notify an applicant with-
in a reasonable time of any action taken. 16 2 An applicant who is de-
nied credit or whose account is terminated may request the creditor
to give reasons for the action taken. 163 In responding to such a re-
quest a creditor may design its own form or methods to satisfy
this requirement.1 6 4  These procedures are to be implemented by
January 31, 1976.165
There are important changes in the area of credit history as
well. In the case of an existing open-end account, a creditor can no
longer require a reapplication, or terminate or change the terms of
an account where there has been a change in name or marital stat-
us. 1 6 Where an applicant has had an account with a spouse previous
to the application for a separate account, the creditor must on the
160. Id., § 202.5(d).
161. Id., § 202.5(m) (1), at 49,308.
162. Id., § 202.5(m)(2). This provision is one of the most controversial in the regula-
tions. Creditors objected strenuously to its inclusion arguing that it would result in undue
administrative burden and expense. Sears, for example, estimated it would cost an added
20 million year to implement such a provision because a computer could probably not be
programmed to do the work. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1975, at col. 1. The Federal Reserve
Board ultimately decided in favor of including it because it was felt omission could sig-
nificantly affect both private and agency efforts to enforce the ECOA.
163. FEDERAL RESERvE SYsTEM Reg. B, § 202.5(m) (3), 40 FED. REG. 49,308 (1975). The
reasons may be given orally or in writing. A suggested form for supplying reasons in
writing is Included in the regulation.
STATEMENT OF REASONS FOR DENIAL OR TERMINATION OF CREDIT
1. Credit application:
not completed.
lack of credit references.
credit reference too new to check.















165. Id., § 202.14(c), at 49,310.
166. Id., § 202.5(i), at 49,307. The various hearings that were held established that lack
of credit history was one of the biggest barriers to equal credit for women. Issie Jenkins
suggested that where there was a lack of prior credit history, a presumption of credit-
worthiness should arise. Otherwise, it was contended, the Equal Credit Opportunity Act
would not affect many of those who are discriminated against because of prior discrimi-
nation. Hearings, supra note 7, at 35.
NOTE 407
request of the applicant consider the credit history of that account. 617
Further, if an applicant can point to an account established prior to
November 1, 1976, as reflecting his or her willingness or ability to
repay, the creditor must use that in his evaluation.'6 1
The guidelines give those who now have an account established
for both spouses an opportunity to establish a separate account.
The creditor is given an affirmative duty to mail or deliver to all
individuals who are contractually liable on a joint account a notice
explaining the provisions of the ECOA and advising them of their
right to have the credit report and credit information in both names of
the spouses. 6 9 This requirement must be complied with by February
1, 1977.170
Creditors are required to keep records, including application
forms and any other information used in evaluating credit worthi-
ness for fifteen months after the date a creditor takes final action
on an application.'
71
If the ECOA seems to unduly favor creditors, the regulations
seem to impose considerable procedural burdens on them. But they
167. FEDE.RAL REsERVE SysTRs Reg. B, § 202.5(j) (2), 40 FED. REG. 49,308 (1975).
168. Id.
169. Id., § 202.6(b). This provision requires the creditor to enclose In the notice a re-
turn, self-addressed envelope. The creditor may include such notice with a billing state-
met. The following is about the regulations required to be In the notice:
NOTICE
CREDIT HISTORY FOR MARRIED PERSONS
The Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act forbids all creditors from dis-
criminating against any applicant on the basis of sex or marital status in
any aspect of a credit transaction. Regulations adopted under the Act give
married persons the right to have credit information concerning those credit
accounts that they hold or use jointly with a spouse reported to consumer re-
porting agencies and creditors in the names of both the wife and husband.
Accounts of married persons opened before November 1976-even those opened
in the names of both spouses-are often reported in only the husband's name.
This is generally true regardless of who has been paying the bills or whose
income was used to obtain the account. As a result, many married women do
not have a credit history in their own names, although their husbands do.
If a woman ever needs to obtain credit on her own, for example, when di-
vorced or widowed, a credit history is usually necessary.
If your account(s) with us is a joint account which you share with
your spouse or an account(s) In the name of one spouse which the other
spouse Is authorized to use, you have the right to have credit information
concerning It reported in both your name and your spouse's name. If you
choose to have credit information concerning your account(s) with us re-
ported in both your name and the name of your spouse, please fill in the
statement below and return it to us.
Please note that the Federal regulation provides that your signature
below will not make either you or your spouse liable for any different or
greater debts. It will only request that credit information be reported in both
your names.
When you furnish credit information on this account, please report all
information concerning it in both your names as follows:
Account Number
170. Id., § 202.6(b) (ii).
171. Id., § 202.9, at 49,309.
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can be assured that they will not incur liability for technical viola-
tions or be subjected to frivolous litigation. The regulations provide
a good faith defense. A creditor is not considered in violation of the
ECOA if he can show by a preponderance of the evidence that at
the time of the alleged violation he maintained reasonable proce-





The Equal Credit Opportunity Act is, in a sense, a compromise
law. There was no question that the equalization of credit in this
country was long overdue. It was in determining how the necessary
remedial legislation should be fashioned wherein Congress faced its
dilemma. The hearings clearly established that 53% of the popula-
tion was not getting a piece of the pie; women were being arbitrar-
ily denied credit on the basis of sex and marital status. On the other
hand the creditors, who are already subject to control by a multi-
tude of federal and state laws, were apprehensive lest they be fur-
ther restricted, making the decision to extend credit an even more
difficult and chancey procedure. Beyond these two conflicting fac-
tions, there was the existence of long-established state property
laws which had to be accorded deference. The legislative answer
was the ECOA, a law which superimposes a federal standard on the
states while retaining the effect of state laws. A law whose terms
are broad, but that has a mechanism with substantive and particu-
larized provisions that may be added as the need arises.
There are those who will maintain that equality cannot be leg-
islated. They will advise that there can be no equal credit opportu-
nity until relationships are restructured, social stereotypes are re-
moved, state laws revised, and until true occupational opportunity
and equal pay for equal productivity are achieved. But this is to
ignore the reality of the societal change that anti-discrimination leg-
islation has effected in the past. The Civil Rights Acts, the Equal
Credit Opportunity Act, and the Equal Pay Act have not been one
hundred percent successful, but they have made significant inroads
on the problem areas to which they were directed. Laws like the
Equal Credit Opportunity Act may not be the only solution to a prob-
lem, but they are a crucial first step and provide a necessary frame-
work on which to construct future legislation.
The nation will feel the impact of the Equal Credit Opportunity
Act, if for no other reason, than because it will be thrust into the con-
sciousness of Americans. It has already been the subject of numer-
ous articles in popular magazines. Its visibility will help insure that
172. Id., § 202.11(a).
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consumers are aware of their rights and that creditors will be more
cautious in their credit decisions. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
though perhaps not the idyllic cure-all of legislative vision, is a sig-
nificant step toward granting women the credit which they deserve.
DONNA DUNKELBERGER GECK

